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The speculation game is an agent-based toy model to investigate the dynamics of the
financial market. Our model has achieved the reproduction of 10 of the well-known
stylized facts for financial time series. However, there is also a divergence from the
behavior of real market. The market price of the model tends to be anti-persistent to
the initial price, resulting in the quite small value of Hurst exponent of price change. To
overcome this problem, we extend the speculation game by introducing a perturbative
part to the price change with the consideration of other effects besides pure speculative
behaviors.
Keywords: Cognitive agent-based model; Round-trip trading; Financial stylized facts.
1. Introduction
The financial time series of asset returns have several qualitative properties collec-
tively called stylized facts. For example, one of the well known stylized facts is called
heavy tails, which describes that the probability distribution of price returns has
fatter tails than those of Gaussian distribution 1,2. Cont summarized 11 currently
well known stylized facts including heavy tails 3. They are quite nontrivial features
which can be observed in different markets and instruments.
To investigate the emerging mechanism of stylized facts, we build a novel simple
agent-based model named Speculation Game 4, which has two distinct features
comparing with preceding agent-based market models. First, it takes account of
round-trip trades by extending the decision-making structure of Minority Game
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5. Second, a mutual projection between players’ realistic and cognitive worlds is
implemented explicitly. As a result of these novelties, Speculation Game succeeds
in reproducing 10 out of the 11 well known stylized facts (see Table 1).
Table 1. The reproducibility of stylized facts in Speculation Game. Symbol “+” shows that the
model successfully recovers the property, and symbol “−” means that it does not.
Stylized fact Reproducibility
Volatility clustering +
Intermittency +
Heavy tails +
Absence of autocorrelation in returns +
Slow decay of autocorrelation in volatilities +
Volume/volatility correlation +
Aggregational Gaussianity +
Conditional heavy tails +
Asymmetry in time scales +
Leverage effect +
Gain/loss asymmetry −
However, there is still a divergence from the behavior of real market. The market
price p(t) of Speculation Game tends to stick around the initial price as Fig. 1
displays (the parameters are fixed as N = 1000, M = 5, S = 2, B = 9, C = 3
in this study), which causes an anti-persistent price change with very small Hurst
exponents. As a power exponent of regression line of standard deviation σ(τ) (or
several other forms) on time scale τ , Hurst exponent H describes the long-term
trend in the price time series. Standard deviations of price changes on different
time scales can be calculated as follows,
σ(τ) =
√
〈(p(t+ τ)− p(t))2〉 − 〈p(t+ τ)− p(t)〉2. (1.1)
When H = 0.5, a price time series is a random walk. When H > 0.5, it shows a
persistent trend while it has a mean-reverting feature whenH < 0.5. Hurst exponent
in Speculation Game is found as H ≃ 0.089, which indicates its price time series
has a too strong mean-reverting characteristic. Note that the fitting of regression is
also not very good as R2 ≃ 0.86 in Fig. 2.
Objective of this study is to overcome the price sticking problem and recover
Hurst exponent to the normal level like ones in the real financial markets. Partic-
ularly, some perturbation is added to price change as the consideration of other
effects besides pure speculative behaviors.
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Fig. 1. The tendency of p(t) to stick around the
initial price (= 100) for whole time periods.
Fig. 2. A poor regression of 100-trial averaged
σ(τ) on τ for 50,000 time steps.
2. Speculation Game and its Extension
Speculation Game is a repeated game in which N players in a gamified market,
with an initial market wealth and randomly given S strategies, compete with each
other to increase wealth through round-trip trades. The game proceeds with updates
alternating between players realistic and cognitive worlds.
At discrete time t, player i using her best strategy j∗ (∈ S) takes an action
a
j∗
i (t) from the set: buy (= 1), sell (= −1), or hold (idle) (= 0). When she sum
its an order with strategy j∗, the quantity of order qi(t) is decided both with her
market wealth wi(t) and the board lot amount B, the latter of which describes the
ease of placing orders with multiple quantities, as follows,
qi(t) = ⌊
wi(t)
B
⌋, (2.2)
where ⌊· · · ⌋ stands for a flooring operator. Note that the closing quantity qi(t) of a
round-trip trade is required to be equal to the opening one qi(t0). Also, the player’s
initial market wealth wi(0) is decided with a uniformly distributed random number
U [0, 100) to enable her to order one unit at least
wi(0) = ⌊B + U [0, 100)⌋. (2.3)
If wi(t) < B as a result of round-trip trade, the player will be forced to leave the
market and substituted by a new player.
Following the order imbalance equation defined by Cont and Bouchaud 6, the
market price change ∆p is calculated as follows by letting the initial market price
as p(0) = 100,
∆p = p(t)− p(t− 1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
a
j∗
i (t)qi(t). (2.4)
Then, the quantized price movement h(t) (the last digit in the history H(t)) is
decided by the magnitude correlation between ∆p and the cognitive threshold C,
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the latter of which can be explained as a threshold value for the players to recognize
a big price move:
h(t) =


2 (largely up) if ∆p > C,
1 (up) if C ≥ ∆p > 0,
0 (stay) if ∆p = 0,
−1 (down) if − C ≤ ∆p < 0,
−2 (largely down) if ∆p < −C.
(2.5)
To find an action of the best strategy aj
∗
i (t), the player with memory M at first
takes the reference of the lastM digits of history H(t). Next, she looks up strategy
j∗ to obtain a recommended action corresponding to the historical pattern (see
Table 2). However, when the recommendation is the same as the opening order
a
j∗
i (t0), the player will hold the position.
Table 2. Example of a strategy for M = 3. Each strategy table holds recommended actions
corresponding to whole historical patterns.
History Recommended action
−2 −2 −2 1
−2 −2 −1 0
−2 −2 0 0
−2 −2 1 −1
−2 −2 2 1
−2 −1 −2 0
...
...
2 2 2 −1
To determine the best strategy j∗, all strategies are evaluated through virtual
round-trip trades in the background similarly. Hence, performance of the strategies
are assessed in the cognitive world, in terms of the accumulated strategy gains Gji (t)
(j ∈ S) calculated with cognitive price P (t) corresponding to the rough information
of ∆p in H(t). Letting P (0) = 0, P (t) is updated as
P (t) = P (t− 1) + h(t). (2.6)
The gain of strategy j in a round-trip trade ∆Gji (t) reads as
∆Gji (t) = a
j
i (t0)(P (t)− P (t0)). (2.7)
Thus, the accumulated strategy gain Gji (t) is calculated by:
G
j
i (t) = G
j
i (t0) + ∆G
j
i (t). (2.8)
September 9, 2019 1:12 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ws-nmnc
The Recovery of Hurst Exponent in Speculation Game 5
Whenever the accumulated gain of the strategy in use Gj
∗
i (t) is updated, all G
j
i (t)
will be reviewed to renew the strategy with the best performance. If the best strategy
happens to be one of the unused strategies with a virtual trade ongoing, the virtual
position will be closed immediately before the player switches the strategy at the
next time step. Note that the evaluating system is developed by considering that the
investing strategies should be evaluated through by round-trip trades, as Katahira
and Akiyama pointed out 7.
Since the self-financing assumption is not required in Speculation Game, when a
round-trip trade is closed in the realistic world, the player’s market wealth wi(t) is
updated with an investment adjustment ∆wi(t), which is the conversion of strategy
gain in the cognitive world with qi(t) taken into consideration,
wi(t) = wi(t0) + ∆wi(t) = wi(t0) + f(∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0)), (2.9)
where f can be an arbitrary function. In the game, ∆wi(t) = ∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0) is used
for the simplicity.
As an extension to the original model, a random perturbation U [−Pb, Pb) is
further added to ∆p as
∆p =
1
N
N∑
i=1
a
j∗
i (t)qi(t) + U [−Pb, Pb), (2.10)
where the first term of Eq. (2.10) could be considered as the effect given by the pure
speculative players while the second one as other effects by other types of traders
such as long term value traders, hedgers, and so on. Due to this extension, ∆p never
takes zero so that H(t) become a quaternary time series instead of a quinary one.
3. Result and Discussion
By adding the random perturbation, the dynamics of market price in Speculation
Game becomes more realistic. As Fig. 3 displays, p(t) can escape from the initial
price range and shows long-term fluctuating structures when Pb = 0.25. Accord-
ingly, Hurst exponent also increases to the normal level (H ≈ 0.3 ∼ 0.7) asH ≃ 0.33
with a better fitting (R2 ≃ 0.99) as the regression line shown in Fig. 4. It can also
be inferred from these results that the long-term fluctuations and trends originated
from those non-speculative behaviors.
On the other hand, the further increment of perturbation would weaken the
stylized properties as well. For instance, the probability distributions of price re-
turns have less heavier tails as more perturbation is added, which is displayed in
Fig. 5. Since the similar propensity is confirmed for many of other reproduced styl-
ized features in Speculation Game, speculative behaviors can be considered as the
main source for the emergence of stylized facts. Note that adding moderate price
perturbation (Pb ≃ 0.2 ∼ 0.3) is favorable in the viewpoint of efficiency to enhance
Hurst exponent because excess Pb contribute less to the increment of H as Fig. 6
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shows. Also, it is reasonable that the perturbation can not make H > 0.5 because
of pure random walk nature.
Fig. 3. The more realistic movement of p(t) with
long-term fluctuations when Pb = 0.25.
Fig. 4. The recovery of Hurst exponent and the
better regression when Pb = 0.25.
Fig. 5. The thinner tails of return distributions
by increasing Pb as 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75.
Fig. 6. The decay in the increment of Hurst
exponent as Pb increases.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
To conclude, adding moderate perturbation to ∆p can solve the price sticking prob-
lem and recover Hurst exponent for our Speculation Game. Simulation results also
indicate that the non-speculative behaviors generate the long-term fluctuations and
trends while speculative ones contribute to the emergence of well-known financial
stylized facts.
For future research, decision-making structures for fundamentalists and news
traders need to be developed for the generation of a long-term trend. Adding per-
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turbation is the simplest way to include the effects brought by those non-pure spec-
ulative behaviors, though these effects should be further verified in a more concrete
way as well.
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